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ABSTRACT 
 
Future mobile systems are expected to exploit the 
flexibility of agent-based software in a variety of 
ways.  This will include agents providing both 
middleware and application-level functionality.  
Realising the full benefits of this innovative 
approach will require that security issues are 
properly addressed. 
There are many security issues associated with 
agent-based systems; some of the most difficult to 
deal with arise when agents themselves can be 
mobile.  There has been much recent interest in 
developing cryptographic protocols designed 
especially for securing mobile agents.  However, 
this work has mainly been ad hoc in nature, i.e. it 
has not been developed in response to a thorough 
analysis of the security requirements for a 
particular agent application.  This paper describes 
research intended to help rectify this gap by 
providing a detailed security architecture including 
a security model and a specification of security 
services provided within the model. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In order for agent technology to be a viable 
solution for wide scale commercial applications, 
the associated security issues need to be properly 
addressed.  Current work within the Mobile VCE 
Core 2 programme includes the development of a 
security model and architecture for agent-based 
mobile middleware and its management. 
This paper describes results of this work, including 
a security model for an agent-based mobile 
system.  This model is used as the basis of a 
security architecture for such systems.  This in 
turn will be used as a framework to develop 
specific mechanisms and protocols to support 
security in this future mobile environment.  These 
security techniques will provide security services 
designed to counter threats identified within the 
context of the security model. 
The Mobile VCE model uses agent technology.  
Agents can exist on all kinds of hosts in the 
infrastructure, from the smallest devices (e.g. 
watch, PDA, or phone) to application servers and 
communications devices.  While some agents will 
be able to move between platforms, others will 
always reside on the same platform.  Whichever is 
the case, certain security functionality is required.  
The envisioned system will also include, and allow, 
devices not using agent technology. 
FIPA (the Foundation for Intelligent Physical 
Agents) is a non-profit organisation aimed at 
producing standards for the interoperation of 
heterogeneous software agents.  FIPA (1) has 
produced a high-level abstract architecture 
specification, which currently is in experimental 
stage.  Security aspects are omitted from the FIPA 
model.  The security model presented in this 
document is specified such that it will fit within the 
FIPA model when deployed in a 
telecommunications environment. 
 
Contents of paper 
 
This document contains two main sections.  The 
first section specifies a detailed security model.  
The second section discusses some of the 
security services that need to be provided within 
the context of this model. 
The security model is specified at four different 
levels of abstraction.  This enables all types of 
interactions, including those within a device and 
those spanning the entire mobile system, to be 
modelled.  The entities identified may sometimes 
coincide.  However, it is important to ensure that 
different functionalities are separated within the 
security model, to ensure that it has sufficient 
generality.  Note that our objective here is to 
model only those parts of security significance.  
The four levels of the model are as follows. 
At the highest level are the Involved parties, 
including the mobile device user, the mobile 
device owner, and various service providers.  At 
the next level down we consider the Device 
structure, including agents, an agent execution 
environment, a subscription module (as in a GSM 
SIM), and communication services.  The next level 
of the model covers the Agent execution 
environment; this will include agent 
communications services, an agent management 
entity, and agent security services.  Finally we 
consider the various parts of an Agent and how it 
interacts with its environment. 
 
THE SECURITY MODEL 
 
Involved parties 
 
We first describe the high level entities that can be 
distinguished in the security model.  The parties 
can be thought of as distinct individuals or 
organisations.  However, in practice one 
organisation can take the roles of more than one 
entity.  It is also possible that not every party would 
be involved in a particular scenario. 
Device user: also referred to as the user.  The 
user is assumed to have physical control over the 
device, but may not necessarily be the same entity 
as the device owner. 
Device provider: the manufacturer of the device.  
In order for the manufacturer to offer upgrades or 
additional services, the device provider will 
typically share a security context with the device. 
This security context will typically involve shared 
secrets and/or the provision of ‘root’ public keys. 
Device owner: which might, for example, be the 
user or might be the employer of the user.  Again 
there is a trust and possibly a cryptographic 
relationship with the device.  The rationale for 
distinguishing the device owner from the device 
user is the fact that they might have different 
objectives.  An employer might, for example, want 
to restrict the use of a device in order to protect 
itself from various threats, such as malicious code. 
Service provider (SP): provides some kind of 
service, (e.g. transport service, information 
service, payment service, etc) including directory 
services and remote agent execution 
environments, to users and other SPs.  A service 
provider may or may not have a pre-established 
contract with its clients. 
'Home' service provider (HSP): i.e. an entity with 
which the device owner or user has a contractual 
relationship.  This gives the provider of services to 
the device an identifiable entity from which he can 
extract payment (the HSP will then present a bill 
for all services provided to the device owner).  
Note that a device owner may have many HSPs. 
Trust service provider (TSP): a special class of 
service provider providing trusted third party 
services, e.g. a CA (Certification Authority), an RA 
(Registration Authority), a timestamping service, 
an electronic notary, etc. 
Agent provider: provides other parties with 
agents. The agent provider would typically be the 
developer of the agent. The agent provider can 
rely on its reputation or issue other guarantees 
concerning provided agents’ behaviour.  The 
agent provider and the agent owner can be 
different entities.  One can envision a scenario 
where software developers provide (e.g. sell) 
agents to users.  The users would then only need 
to provide the agent with certain credentials. 
Agent owner: the entity on whose behalf an agent 
is executing.  All parties can deploy agents to act 
on their behalf.  These agents can execute on a 
device under the control of the agent owner as 
well as in other places within the infrastructure. 
 
Device structure 
 
We now describe the different parts of a device, 
including most importantly agents and the agent 
execution environment.  It should be noted that 
devices and their resources can vary greatly, and 
depending on their purpose might not include all 
the components described here.  The device 
described is a mobile one, but a similar structure 
can be assumed to exist within other devices in 
the infrastructure in which agents are executed. 
A diagram of the device model is given in Figure 
1.  Only one agent is shown in the picture, but a 
device would typically have multiple agents 
executing in the agent execution environment. 
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Figure 1 – Model for elements within a device 
 
The elements of the device model are as follows. 
Agent: executable code which is acting on behalf 
of its owner.  All parties can use agents to 
represent themselves.  An agent can execute in 
an environment that is under the control of its (i.e. 
the agent’s) owner, or it may execute in an 
environment provided by another party.  Agents 
may or may not be mobile.  As illustrated in Figure 
1, an agent can communicate with other entities 
over a network as well as with other functional 
blocks within the same device, including device 
resources, a subscription module, other agents, 
and other device software. 
Agent execution environment: provides the 
resources needed for agents to execute and 
communicate with other agents as well as with 
other resources and entities.  The agent execution 
environment, further described below, is regulated 
and controlled via mechanisms here referred to as 
agent control.  Several agents can execute 
simultaneously within one environment. 
Subscription module: a hardware device (e.g. 
smart card, USB token) which may interact with 
the device.  An example of such a module is the 
GSM SIM.  This module would typically be 
provided by an HSP, and share secret keys with a 
HSP and/or possess HSP-provided root public 
keys.  Not every mobile device will be capable of 
directly interacting with such a module. 
Remote resources: agents executing in a device 
can communicate with resources (e.g. agents and 
services) on other devices. 
Non-agent software: software (applications and 
middleware functions) residing on the same 
device but not under the control of the agent 
platform control.  Agents can communicate with 
such software just as such software would be able 
to access middleware services. 
Device resources: refers to other resources 
residing in the device.  Examples of such 
resources include a user interface, a hardware 
cryptographic processor, various cryptographic 
primitives that might be bound to the device (e.g. 
in the form of a cryptographic API), and 
communication resources. 
 
Agent execution environment 
 
The security functionality of the agent execution 
environment is now described.  We only consider 
security functionality here, and a complete 
execution environment would be more complex.  A 
diagram of the agent execution environment is 
given in Figure 2.  It should be noted that, 
depending on the device on which the agent 
execution environment is residing, not all the 
elements of this model may exist.  A device might, 
for example, not support the downloading of 
agents – in which case the agent mobility service 
would not exist.  The complete agent execution 
environment will include the following elements. 
Agent management and control: governs the 
security platform.  This element is responsible for 
managing all agents executing on the platform 
including monitoring and controlling access to 
resources as well as communication between 
agents executing on the local platform.  
Agent communications service: provides 
communications facilities to agents executing 
within the environment.  This includes secure 
communication services. 
Agent security service: includes security 
services provided by the environment to executing 
agents.  For example, the environment may add a 
digital signature to data (signed with the private 
device signature key) at the request of an agent. 
Agent mobility service: enables agents to send 
themselves (and associated stored state) to other 
devices.  The service also includes functionality to 
assess received agents and any associated 
security information to decide if an agent shall be 
granted permission to execute on the platform.  
Agents requesting transfer to another platform will 
also be assessed for appropriate privileges here.  
If required, the agent mobility service can add 
platform specific information (e.g. agent trail) 
before transmission.  The agent mobility service is 
responsible for setting up secure transmission 
channels when required for agent transfers. 
Event logging service: logs security relevant 
events for storage in an audit trail.  It may also 
provide security intrusion detection based on 
processing of recorded events. 
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Figure 2 – Agent execution environment architecture 
In addition to the described elements making up 
the execution environment, the following 
elements/functionality (which also appear in Figure 
2) are part of the architecture. 
The security policy and access control 
database regulate the behaviour of the security 
mechanisms.  Information making up the security 
policy could include a rule base describing how, 
and when agents can be given access to the 
execution environment, and can interact with each 
other and their environment.  Other examples 
include the specification of security related events 
for which log entries should be generated, and 
what controls should be implemented in order for 
an agent to start execution.  The access control 
database contains information governing how 
various resources can be accessed by the various 
parties (this information could, for example, be in 
the form of an Access Control List (ACL) or a set 
of capabilities, or some combination of the two). 
Remote systems can dispatch agents to the 
platform for execution.  In the same manner, the 
agent execution environment can dispatch agents 
to execute in other environments. 
Log storage and post processing manages and 
processes log data once generated. 
Device resources and subscription module 
includes all kinds of resources (hardware and 
software) residing on the device. 
Trust Service Provider (TSP) provides various 
trust services. 
Remote resources are resources residing on 
other platforms with which agents can 
communicate, including other agents. 
 
An agent 
 
The various agent parts are likely to have different 
properties that need to be addressed via 
appropriate security mechanisms.  The following 
distinctions between component parts of an agent 
can be made.  Note that this agent model is 
designed for the purposes of security analysis 
only.  As a result, important agent functionality 
may not be covered within this model. 
Core executable part: executable information.  
This information is distinguished from other 
information to allow a user to obtain an agent from 
an independent party (agent provider). 
Payloads: An agent is likely to have various kinds 
of payloads.  Payloads can consist of non-
executable data as well as executable information 
required by the agent to fulfil its task.  Execution 
state, information supplied by the agent owner, 
and information collected at various hosts (for 
mobile agents), are all examples of payloads of an 
agent.  In addition to this, an agent can obtain 
executable payloads to add agent functionality that 
is not part of the core executable part. 
By separating agent parts in this way integrity 
verification values can be created where 
appropriate.  The use of the above distinctions 
becomes particular apparent for mobile agents, 
but is also relevant for agents that are transferred 
to be executed on a platform not belonging to the 
agent provider.  (We are here defining a mobile 
agent to be an agent that can move ‘on its own 
initiative’ and continue execution in the 
environment where it arrives.) 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
 
Various classes of security services can be 
identified in the context of the security model.  We 
focus on one such class, namely services to 
protect the execution platform.  However, we also 
briefly review services to protect the agents. 
 
Platform protection 
 
We now describe security functionality addressing 
the protection of the execution environment.  Note 
that agent execution environments will exist in 
various kinds of devices and the precise 
functionality, including security functionality, 
provided by the environment will also vary.  
Hence, the functionality described here may not 
be implemented in every device. 
 
Logical Access Control.  The platform needs to 
protect itself and its hosted agents against 
unauthorised access.  Such functionality is often 
implemented in existing operating systems and 
execution environments.  It can be implemented 
by using the sandbox concept, where executable 
code (e.g. an agent) would be able to do anything 
within the sandbox while any actions involving 
resources outside the sandbox are closely 
regulated and monitored.  With this approach, the 
effort necessary to ensure the correctness of code 
received from outside the platform can be limited.  
However, in order to make full use of agents they 
need to be able to access resources outside the 
sandbox.  Resources outside the sandbox include 
resources located on the same physical device as 
well as the ability to communicate with other 
devices/hosts/agents. 
The execution environment has a security policy 
that regulates the requirements under which an 
access request will be granted.  At this stage of 
the system design process it appears possible that 
an access control list (ACL) in combination with a 
capability-based scheme may be required for the 
provision of access control information.  While an 
ACL is rather static in its nature, although dynamic 
changes to the list can be made, a capability 
scheme allows a subject to provide the required 
information at the point of an access request.  A 
capability scheme based on public key 
cryptography and a PKI will allow for the required 
delegation and transfer of rights between parties. 
The agent management and control element is the 
main entity within the agent environment 
architecture enforcing access control.  However 
access control is also part of the functionality of 
mobility, event logging, agent security, and agent 
communication services. 
 
Authentication of foreign code.  To provide 
flexibility a host needs to be able to receive, 
retrieve and execute agents.  In fact, this applies 
to any downloadable code, and not only agents.  
In a mobile environment, with constant changes 
taking place, the ability to receive and execute 
software is likely to be very important. 
As mentioned above, limited access can be given 
to an untrusted program in such a way that its 
behaviour can be regulated to prevent any 
potentially harmful behaviour.  However, this is not 
enough to provide more powerful functionality.  
Applications will need to be given access to 
resources that, if misused, can result in 
unauthorised and potentially harmful actions. 
Research on ‘provably secure code’ has been 
undertaken for several years.  This research aims 
to verify that a piece of code is secure before it 
begins execution.  However useful this would be, 
this is still very much an emerging area, and it is 
not clear how feasible it would be to restrict agents 
to those which have formal proofs of security.  A 
more pragmatic approach is to trust a particular 
piece of software because one decides to trust the 
developer/supplier of the software.  This technique 
is used in Java as well as in MExE (2).  Using this 
technique we need ways of verifying that a 
particular piece of software does originate from a 
particular party.  This can be done through 
cryptographic means. 
When an agent arrives at the execution 
environment, various security checks are made by 
the mobility service.  The following information 
associated with the agent can be verified and used 
by the mobility service in order to decide whether 
an agent should be granted execution rights:  
Agent owner, Agent provider, Required resources, 
Submitting host, Agent trail. 
 
Platform communication.  The platform will 
communicate with other entities in the 
infrastructure.  For example, agents will be 
transferred between platforms and various trusted 
service providers will be contacted.  Depending on 
the nature and sensitivity of the communication, 
various levels of protection are required. 
 
Event logging.  Unlike most security features 
which prevent security breaches, auditing enables 
follow-up when something goes wrong.  The main 
purpose of an audit trail is to store information for 
later examination.  Examples of applications for 
audit data include fraud detection, intrusion 
detection, and follow-up in case of failure or 
security breach.  Audit information can also be 
used for real-time monitoring in order to take 
immediate actions in case of security violation. 
The event logging service within the agent 
execution environment is responsible for 
generating audit trails.  The security policy governs 
what is regarded as a security event to be logged.  
(Audit events can also be generated through the 
initiative of an agent.) 
Once audit data is generated it needs to be stored 
and properly protected.  Storage can be at the 
local platform but can also be at a trusted party or 
other remote site.  If security of the platform is 
compromised it can be valuable to have 
transferred the audit data prior to the point of 
attack.  This does, of course, involve network 
traffic, and hence is not always the best option. 
Once stored, audit data can be analysed.  The 
analysis can be automatic, e.g. by looking for 
known patterns or anomalies, or manual.  The 
latter would apply particularly in the case of a 
security breach. 
 
Agent protection 
 
Analogously, security functionality is needed to 
protect agents executing in the agent execution 
environment.  Issues to be addressed include: 
physical security, agent/platform authentication, 
agent mobility, agent communication, non-
repudiation and event logging. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
In future work within Mobile VCE Core 2 we will 
develop specifications for security mechanisms 
and protocols to provide the security services 
specified in this security architecture. 
The work reported in this paper has formed part of 
the Software Based Systems area of the Core 2 
Research Programme of the Virtual Centre of 
Excellence in Mobile & Personal Communications, 
Mobile VCE, www.mobilevce.com, whose 
funding support, including that of the EPSRC, is 
gratefully acknowledged.  More detailed technical 
reports on this research are available to Industrial 
Members of Mobile VCE. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. FIPA, FIPA Abstract Architecture Specification.  
Document number: XC00001J, 10/08/2001, 
Available online from www.fipa.org. 
2. ETSI, Mobile station application execution 
environment (MExE), Functional description, 
Stage 2, 3GPP TS23.057 version 4.3. Release 4, 
October 2001. 
